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 Non-technical summary 
 
In recent years, the view of patents as a policy tool to stimulate R&D has increasingly come 
under criticism. The theoretical literature has shown that when research is sequential and builds upon 
previous innovations, stronger patents may discourage follow-on inventions and a debate has emerged 
over the extent to which patent “thickets” may stifle innovation. Patent thickets can be defined as “a 
dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in 
order to actually commercialize new technology”.  
 
While some progress has been made in empirically characterizing thickets in terms of 
fragmented ownership of patent rights, there is very little evidence about how effectively the market 
for technology can mitigate their effects, and the extent to which this affects innovative performance.  
In this paper, we investigate these questions using survey data on licensing activity and innovation by 
German manufacturing and service firms. We use indexes of fragmentation of patent rights based on 
the patent portfolios of firms operating in the respective technologies of the German companies. 
 
We find evidence that firms facing patent thickets have a higher propensity to engage in in-
licensing. Therefore markets for technology may provide an effective mitigating mechanism for the 
defragmentation of rights. We then analyze the relationship between fragmentation and innovative 
performance, considering separately firms requiring access to patented technology (in-licensors) and 
firms that do not require this access (non-licensors). For firms that report positive expenditures on in-
licensing, we find a negative relationship between fragmentation of IP rights and innovative 
performance as measured by introduction of new products. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, 
for firms that require licenses to commercialize new technology, the fragmentation of upstream 
property rights hampers innovation. The negative effect on product innovation is particularly strong 
for in-licensing firms with few patents, which suggests an important strategic role for building up a 
large patent portfolio in the context of fragmented property rights.  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
In der Vergangenheit sind Patente als Anreizmechanismus für Forschung und Entwicklung in 
die Kritik geraten. Die theoretische Literatur hat gezeigt, dass bei auf früheren Innovationen 
aufbauender sequentieller Forschung stärkere Patentrechte die nachfolgenden Innovationen behindern 
können. Es entstand eine Debatte darüber, in welchem Ausmaß „Patentdickichte“ Innovationen 
erschweren. Unter Patentdickichten versteht man „ein undurchlässiges Netz von sich 
überschneidenden Rechten zum Schutz von geistigem Eigentum, durch das sich ein Unternehmen den 
Weg bahnen muss, um neue Technologien auf den Markt bringen zu können.“  
 
Obwohl Fortschritte in der empirischen Beschreibung von Patentdickichten gemacht wurden, 
gibt es wenig Evidenz dafür, ob der Markt für Technologien den Einfluss von Dickichten 
abschwächen kann und in welchem Ausmaß Dickichte die Innovationsleistung von Unternehmen 
behindertn. In dieser Arbeit gehen wir diesen Fragen anhand von Daten über Lizenzaktivitäten und 
Innovationen von deutschen Unternehmen im verarbeitenden Gewerbe und im Dienstleistungsbereich 
nach. Das verwendete Fragmentierungsmaß baut auf Patentportfolios von Unternehmen auf, die in den 
gleichen Technologien tätig sind, wie die beobachteten deutschen Unternehmen. 
 
Wir finden einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen dem Ausmaß von Patentdickichten und 
der Wahrscheinlichkeit Patente einzulizenzieren. Märkte für Technologien sind also ein möglicher 
Mechanismus, um mit der Defragmentierung von Patentrechten umzugehen. Anschließend analysieren 
wir die Beziehung zwischen Fragmentierung und Innovationserfolg separat für Unternehmen die einen 
Zugang zu patentierten Technologien benötigen (lizenzierende Unternehmen) und für Unternehmen, 
welche keinen Zugang benötigen (nicht lizenzierende Unternehmen). Für lizenzierende Unternehmen 
finden wir einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen der Fragmentierung von Patentrechten und dem 
Innovationserfolg gemessen als Umsatz mit neuen Produkten. Dies ist konsistent mit der Hypothese, 
dass Fragmentierung für Unternehmen die Lizenzen benötigen die Kommerzialisierung von neuen 
Produkten erschwert. Negative Auswirkungen auf Produktinnovationen sind bei lizenzierenden 
Unternehmen mit einer geringen Anzahl Patente besonders stark. Daraus ergibt sich eine strategische 
Bedeutung des Aufbaus eines großen Patentportfolios im Zusammenhang mit fragmentierten 
Eigentumsrechten.  
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Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship between fragmented intellectual property 
(IP) rights and innovative performance, taking into consideration the role 
played by in-licensing of IP. Controlling for a variety of firm and market 
characteristics, we find that firms facing more fragmented IP landscapes are 
more likely to report expenditures on in-licensing and for those firms that do 
incur license costs we find a weak positive association between licensing 
expenditure and fragmented IP rights in the relevant technology. We also 
observe a negative relationship between IP fragmentation and innovative 
performance, but only for firms that engage in in-licensing and only for 
product innovation. The relationship between fragmentation and innovative 
performance also depends on the size of a firm’s patent portfolio, which 
suggests an important strategic role for defensive patenting in the context of 
fragmented property rights.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the view of patents as a policy tool to stimulate R&D has increasingly come 
under criticism. A theoretical literature has shown that when research is sequential and builds 
upon previous innovations, stronger patents may discourage follow-on inventions (Merges and 
Nelson 1990, Scotchmer 1991, etc.), and a debate has emerged over the extent to which patent 
“thickets” may stifle innovation. Defined by Shapiro (2001) as “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology”, patent thickets may be particularly onerous in the context of 
cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents where the costs associated with patents may 
outweigh any positive impact on R&D incentives.  
The potential for patent thickets to stifle innovation depends on the extent to which they 
raise the costs of innovators.  In general, patents held by one firm are likely to impose some costs 
on other innovators, such as incremental R&D expenditures to design around patents, or licensing 
fees paid for rights to use patented technology.  Where there is a patent “thicket” these costs may 
be large enough to materially impact incentives to innovate, and in the extreme case, an 
“impenetrable” patent thicket may completely block inventors from accessing some technologies, 
or from bringing improvements to market.   
In principle, the ability to negotiate licensing contracts with patent holders should allow 
firms to use patented inventions.  Gallini (2002) notes that the stifling effects of stronger patents 
may be mitigated by in-licensing or other arrangements to use patented technology in 
downstream research projects. Indeed, Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001), Gans and Stern 
(2000), Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002), and others have highlighted the role of patents and other 
formal IP rights in supporting a “market for technology” which provides an avenue for new 
entrants to realize value from innovation by licensing, entering into collaboration agreements, or 
selling themselves to incumbents. However, there may be circumstances under which licensing 
does not alleviate the thicket problem, either because licensors and licensees cannot agree on 
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terms1, or because the total cost of obtaining all of the necessary licenses are prohibitive.  In these 
circumstances, downstream innovation may be impeded in spite of attempts to gain access to 
upstream patented technology through licensing. 
Obviously, where more licenses must be taken to “clear a path” through the thicket, total 
costs are likely to be higher.  But an important distinction can be drawn between increases in 
costs that reflect larger numbers of patents to be licensed, and increases that reflect transactions 
costs associated with bargaining for license rights—for example if the requisite IP is held by a 
large number of assignees.  (Thickets are often discussed in tandem with the anti-commons 
problem, a concept discussed by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) in which a proliferation of upstream 
property rights leads to an underutilization of patented intermediate technologies and a slowdown 
in downstream innovation.) A number of recent papers have focused on the implications of 
excessive “fragmentation” of ownership of the patents necessary to commercialize a product.  
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the nature of the IP “landscape” faced 
by a firm and the extent to which the firm participates in markets for technology via licensing. 
We focus on the fragmentation of rights, using the currently most common measure of thicket 
costs, the fragmentation index inspired by Ziedonis (2004).2 Previous work has shown that firms 
facing more fragmented IP landscapes have lower market values (Noel and Schankerman (2006)) 
and that start-up companies entering markets in which there are larger numbers of patents and 
assignees see the initial round of funding delayed (Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007)).3  We then 
examine the implications of fragmentation of IP rights for firms’ innovative performance.   
                                                 
1 Razgaitis (2006) reports that 50% or more of substantive licensing negotiations fail to result in an 
executed agreeement, with the leading cause of “deal failure” being inability to agree on financial terms. 
2 Ziedonis (2004) shows that semiconductor firms in the US patent more aggressively when the ownership 
of complementary patents is more highly fragmented. Von Graevenitz et al. (2008) find higher patenting 
activity by European firms in complex industries if patent rights are more intertwined. 
3 Bessen and Maskin (2000) and Bessen and Hunt (2007), have argued that more-and-stronger patent rights 
have induced a decline in R&D spending in industries affected by software patents.  Cockburn and 
MacGarvie (2007) find that software  markets in which there are more patents have fewer entrants, after 
controlling for the characteristics of the firm and market (including the average importance of patents in the 
market and the  stage of the product lifecycle).  However, patents also play a role in stimulating entry: 
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) finds that firms holding patents related to a software market are 
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Transactions in the market for technology, in the form of licensing agreements, are one 
way to “clear a path through the thicket” but may be more or less effective in “clearing a path 
through the thicket” depending on the nature of technology in a particular market, the nature of IP 
rights, and the capabilities of both licensee and licensor firms.  Where IP rights are highly 
fragmented, licensing agreements can be a way to “reassemble” fragmented IP, but we note that 
in such circumstances agreements may be particularly difficult to negotiate, and are likely to be 
subject to more severe bargaining problems , with the total price paid by the licensor firm likely 
to be higher than where rights are held by fewer owners.  
While some progress has been made in empirically characterizing thickets in terms of 
fragmented ownership of patent rights, there is very little evidence about how effectively the 
market for technology can mitigate their effects, and the extent to which this affects innovative 
performance.  In this paper, we investigate these questions using survey data on licensing activity 
and innovation by German manufacturing and service firms, and indexes of fragmentation of 
patent rights based on the patent portfolios of firms operating in their technologies. Specifically, 
we test the hypotheses that firms facing fragmented IP landscapes will a) be more likely to 
engage in in-licensing to bring together the requisite pieces of upstream technology, and b) will 
spend more on licensing due to the larger number of parties with whom the firms must enter into 
contracts. We find evidence that markets for technology may provide an effective mitigating 
mechanism for “defragmenting” rights in the sense of a positive relationship between the degree 
of fragmentation of patent ownership in the industry, and these firms’ propensity to engage in in-
licensing.  We then analyze the relationship between fragmentation and innovative performance, 
considering separately firms requiring access to patented technology (in-licensors) and firms that 
                                                                                                                                                 
approximately three times more likely to enter that market.  Hall (2005) shows that patents have a 
particularly strong correlation with market value for entrants, and suggests that they play a role in helping 
entrants secure financing.  Häussler, Harhoff, Müller (2008) and Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) show 
that the number of patent applications held by a private firm speeds up the rate at which the firm obtains 
VC financing.  
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evidently do not require this access (non-licensors). We also examine this relationship separately 
for product and process innovations, with the expectation that only the former should be affected 
by the fragmentation of IP rights. The relationship between participation in the market for 
technology and innovative performance is complex:  overall, we find a weak positive relationship 
between fragmentation and innovative performance, but a quite different effect for firms that 
engage in in-licensing versus those who do not.  For firms that report positive expenditures on in-
licensing, we find a negative relationship between fragmentation of IP rights and innovative 
performance as measured by introduction of new products.  As expected, this negative 
relationship is restricted to product innovation. Conversely, for firms that do not engage in in-
licensing, we observe a puzzling positive relationship between fragmentation and innovative 
performance.  While this may reflect our inability to completely control for characteristics of the 
product market, or for the full set of determinants of the “make versus buy” decision in acquiring 
technology, this finding suggests that the firm’s optimal IP strategy depends on its position in the 
patent landscape.  We also find that the negative effect on innovation is particularly strong for 
licensing firms with few patents, while the positive relationship between fragmentation and 
innovation comes largely from firms with many patents.  
 
2. Background and Empirical Framework 
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) pointed out that when there are too many upstream patent-holders 
from which an innovator must obtain licenses in order to operate, the innovator may under-invest 
in R&D.  Bessen (2004), in an extension of the Green and Scotchmer (1995) model of sequential 
innovation, shows that when innovation is cumulative and the development costs of second-round 
innovators are private knowledge, patent holders may engage in hold-up by not offering ex ante 
licenses. Lemley and Shapiro (2007) discuss the impact of the threat of holdup and royalty 
stacking on licensing in the context of cumulative innovation, and argue that the ability of patent 
holders to threaten downstream producers with injunctions can act as a tax on innovation. This 
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problem is likely to be especially pernicious in the context of cumulative and complex 
technologies for which the downstream product potentially infringes on many patents and thus 
requires licenses from multiple parties (the problem of “royalty stacking”).  Royalty stacking 
increases the amount a firm must pay to licensors in order to bring a product to market, and when 
the problem is severe, may reduce the rate of innovation.  Royalty stacks are likely to be higher 
where there are more layers i.e. patent holders, and even higher where there are problems with 
negotiating a total price for the stack in the face of many independent owners of its components. 
Following Ziedonis (2004), the literature on patent thickets has focused on the 
“fragmentation” of property rights. Ziedonis argues that, when patents on complementary 
innovations are distributed widely among a large number of potential licensors, the firms 
requiring access to those innovations will patent more aggressively in an attempt to prevent 
litigation (believing that a large patent portfolio can be used to threaten a reciprocal suit). This 
should be particularly true when firms are highly capital-intensive. Ziedonis finds evidence in 
support of these hypotheses, using a measure of fragmentation based on the concentration (among 
patent holders) of backward citations in firms’ patents. Versions of this measure of fragmentation 
have come to be used in a number of subsequent papers, including this one. Noel and 
Schankerman (2007) find that firms facing more fragmented IP landscapes have lower market 
values. Von Graevenitz and Siebert (2006) empirically demonstrate a negative relationship 
between the fragmentation of property rights and the extent of licensing, and Clark and Konrad 
(2008) show theoretically that fragmented property rights lead to decreased R&D effort in patent 
races. 
In contrast to the papers which find negative implications of fragmentation, Gerardin, 
Layne-Farrar, and Padilla (2006) argue that royalty stacking is rarely a problem and that several 
mechanisms exist (e.g. cross-licensing) to circumvent it.  Lichtman (2006) argues that when the 
pieces of IP required to commercialize a technology are held by multiple parties, the value at 
stake in each negotiation is lower and therefore firms should have less reason to litigate.  Galasso 
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and Schankerman (2008) find evidence in support of this hypothesis, showing that firms involved 
in patent disputes that face fragmented IP landscapes arrive at settlements more quickly. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between fragmentation and licensing costs, 
as well as the role played by licensing in mediating the relationship between fragmentation and 
innovative performance. Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) argue that stronger IP rights increase both 
the absolute returns to innovation as well as the returns to cooperation (i.e. selling an innovation 
to an incumbent) relative to competition. Anand and Khanna (2000) use data on licensing 
announcements from the SDC database to show that variations in the strength of IPRs across 
industries affect the amount and nature of the licensing contracts entered into. It is likely that the 
pure strength of IP rights may not be the only factor affecting the participation of firms in the 
market for technology, but that characteristics of the “IP landscape” also play an important role. 
This paper focuses on the relationship between fragmentation and in-licensing. Relatively few 
empirical papers model the determinants of firms’ expenditures on licenses. Link and Scott 
(2003) show that firms are more likely to license when their patents cite the patents of potential 
licensors. Cassiman and Veugelers (2000) relate licensing versus in-house development of 
technology to the external environment of the firm using CIS survey data for Belgium.  
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2005) study licensing expenditures by incumbents and entrants using the 
same innovation survey data we consider in the present paper. They find that incumbents spend 
more on licenses than do potential entrants.4 Czarnitzki and Kraft (2005) also find that exporters 
spend more on licenses than do importers and non-trading firms. Larger firms spend more on 
licenses, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of sales or as a percentage of innovation 
expenditures.  
   
                                                 
4 Czarnitzki and Kraft (2005) identify entrants as the firms that rate as very important (choosing 5 on a 5-
point Likert scale) as a motive for innovation “the enlargement of the product portfolio outside of the main 
markets you are operating in.” Incumbents are classified as firms that use innovation for the purposes of 
“securing and increasing the current market share.” 
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 In this paper, we consider the relationship between the IP landscape faced by a firm and 
the extent of the firm’s participation in the market for technology via in-licensing. We focus on 
the fragmentation of “upstream” IP rights, that is, whether the firm must obtain licenses from 
multiple parties to bring a product to market. While we do not observe the specific potential 
licensors, we construct a measure of fragmentation based on the citations made by the patents 
held by a particular firm. In brief, in an industry characterized by cumulative and complex 
technology, when a firm’s citations are concentrated among a few entities we expect licensing 
costs to be lower than when citations are spread broadly across many parties. This follows the 
work of Ziedonis (2004), Noel and Schankerman (2006), and others (see above). 
 Clearly, it will be important to distinguish between large incumbents licensing new 
developments from start-ups or small competitors and small innovators licensing IP from 
upstream innovators.  We examine the differences between firms with large numbers of patents 
and firms with few patents. We expect that the former, the “insiders”, will have advantages in 
negotiating the terms of licenses with upstream firms, due to greater experience with the patent 
system, or greater bargaining power arising from holding scarce complementary assets or the 
ability to offer opportunities for cross-licensing.  “Outsiders,” with fewer of these advantages, are 
expected to be particularly affected by the nature of the IP landscape.  
 In principle, it will be important in what follows to distinguish between the impact of 
fragmentation of IP rights on incentives to participate in licensing from the effects of general 
product differentiation in the markets in which the firm competes.  Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella (2001) show that the propensity to license should be more widespread when product 
differentiation is lower (due to the lower rent-dissipation effects of licensing), and validate this 
theoretical prediction using data on product differentiation and licensing in the chemical industry.  
Thus, to the extent that we are unable to fully control for the degree of product differentiation, our 
results on licensing may be biased towards finding a negative relationship between licensing and 
fragmentation, which is the opposite of what we actually find.  The extent of product 
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differentiation is difficult to measure consistently across industries, however in an effort to 
control for this effect, and any more general association between market structure and licensing, 
we include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the firm’s major sector in our regressions. 
 
3. Data 
The analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual survey which focuses 
on the innovative activities of German companies. The survey is conducted annually by the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research. Every fourth year the survey is part of the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) conducted by Eurostat.  The questionnaire follows the guidelines of the Oslo 
Manual for collecting innovation data (OECD and Eurostat, 1997).  The target population of the 
MIP covers legally independent firms in Germany with at least 5 employees and covers both the 
manufacturing and the service sector. 
Information on in-licensing of technology is available for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 
2000 and 2004. In these years information on four subgroups of innovation expenditures was 
asked, namely internal R&D, external R&D, machinery and equipment for innovative activities, 
and acquisition of other external knowledge. The survey provides information both on whether or 
not companies engaged in each of these activities as well as how much money they spent.  
 Patent information from the European Patent Office (EPO) is merged at the company 
level to the MIP. Since we use a fragmentation index at the technology level, we use the patent 
information to determine to which technology the majority of patent applications belongs. We 
therefore need to restrict the sample to companies with at least one patent application. We restrict 
the sample to companies with less than 1500 employees. Larger companies are often active in 
several technology areas. The fragmentation of ownership rights in one technology would be an 
imprecise indicator for the situation they face when introducing one specific product.   
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 Our measure of fragmentation differentiates between 30 technologies.5 The classification 
into 30 technologies is taken from the update of OECD (1994). For each year the current 
applications of all companies applying to the EPO are divided into 30 technologies, i.e. for each 
company up to 30 subportfolios are defined. 6 For each technology the fragmentation of the 
subportfolios is calculated and averaged over the companies. The correction factor for number of 
patents in the portfolio is used. For the calculation of the measure all EPO applicants are used, i.e. 
there is no restriction with respect to applicant country. Only references in the “X” and “Y” 
categories are considered, i.e. only those references that are detrimental to the novelty of the 
patent. References that are only included to describe the technological background are omitted. 
 In the formula below Fragjt refers to fragmentation in technology j in year t. sijkt is the 
share of backward citations in company i’s subportfolio of applications in technology j that refer 
to patents hold by company k. 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= ∑∑
==
K
k
ijkt
N
i
jt sFrag N 1
2
1
11  
 
 Only companies that meet a minimum size requirement are included in the calculation of 
the fragmentation index. Companies need to have filed at least 100 patents in the time period 
1987-2002 and need to have at least three years of positive applications in a given technology 
area. This minimum size requirement is necessary to obtain a meaningful fragmentation measure, 
with very small numbers of patents in each technology, spuriously high or low values are likely to 
be obtained.  In part this is due to that fact that at the EPO patent documents contain fewer 
references than at the USPTO (for our sample we find on average 4.3 references per application). 
This is also a reason why we prefer to use the fragmentation measure computed at the technology 
                                                 
5 We thank Georg von Graevenitz, Dietmar Harhoff and Stefan Wagner for making the information on the 
fragmentation index available to us. 
6 Data from the database PATSTAT (“EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database”) is used for the 
calculation of the fragmentation index. 
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level as opposed to the company level. The median number of patent applications in our sample is 
only four and 28% of the companies have only one application, leading to a very noisy 
calculation of fragmentation at the company level.7 
 We measure innovative performance separately for product and for process innovations. 
The success of product innovation is measured in the MIP as the share of sales with products that 
are new to the market and have been introduced by the companies in the three year period 
preceding the survey. Fragmentation of IP rights can be expected to affect firms’ abilities to 
innovate in a variety of ways, and we focus on this measure on the grounds that it should capture 
the ability of firms not just to generate new products in the sense of concepts or prototypes, but to 
get past any patent thicket and realize sales. For process innovations we use the percentage cost 
reduction that was achieved by process innovations that have been introduced by the company in 
the three year period preceding the survey.  For many technologies, process innovations are 
generally more difficult to patent, infringement is more difficult to detect, and less subject to 
thicketing. 
 
4. Results 
After matching the MIP dataset to patent data, and excluding firms with more than 1500 
employees, our dataset contains 1616 observations for 1034 companies.  Summary statistics on 
our dataset are found in Tables 1-2.  
 As Table 1 shows, the mean firm in our data had 346 employees, 62.4 million Euro in 
sales, and spent 1.16 million Euro on R&D.   56% were innovators, in the sense of realizing sales 
from a product that was new to the market, while 79% had introduced a product that was new to 
the firm.  Of greatest interest for this paper, 22% reported spending money on licensing 
technology.  The amounts spent on licensing are quite small relative to sales: in the entire sample, 
                                                 
7 We tested the company level fragmentation measure in exploratory regressions but found mostly no 
relationship with the variables of interest. 
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the average amount spent on licensing as a percentage of sales was 0.054%.  However, among 
those firms that spent anything on licensing, the ratio was 0.26%.  A handful of firms in these 
data are clearly outliers, reporting licensing expenditures as high as more than 155% of sales.  
While interesting in their own right, these firms are clearly engaged in distinct activities (for 
example, “brokering” technology), and we exclude them from this analysis.8   
 By contrast to the licensing data, many more firms in the sample report nonzero R&D 
expenditure: 78% perform R&D, (76% spent at least 100,000 euros), and the average R&D sales 
ratio was 3.21%.  Conditional on reporting positive R&D spending the R&D sales ratio was 
4.1%.  As with the licensing data, there are a handful of outliers in the dataset, with R&D/sales 
ratios of more than 85%.  These are generally the same firms that report exceptionally high 
licensing/sales ratios and are excluded from the sample. 
 The fragmentation index ranges from 0.607 to 0.794 across the 30 industries in this 
sample.  Weighted by the number of firms in each technology represented in our sample, the 
average value is 0.725.   
 Table 2 gives simple correlations between key variables.  As can be seen from the table, 
the raw correlation between licensing/sales and R&D/sales is 0.11, consistent with the idea that 
innovative firms are more likely to be participants in the “market for technology.”  The raw 
correlation between licensing/sales and the fragmentation index is very small, though positive, 
which on its face suggests only very limited use of licensing as a solution to deal with 
fragmentation of IP rights.  However this is clearly a problem with both confounding with other 
effects, and the skewness of the licensing/sales variable. 
 Turning to the regression results, we begin by examining the relationship between 
licensing expenditures as a percentage of sales and IP fragmentation. The results are found in 
Table 3. Since the dependent variable is truncated at 0, we use a Tobit model. We control for the 
                                                 
8 Specifically, we drop observations where licensing/sales > 2.27%. We also drop some observations with 
very large absolute amounts of licensing expenditure. 
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firms’ R&D/sales ratio, the patent stock of the firm normalized by employment, firm size (the log 
of the number of employees), log of total patent applications per year at the EPO in the relevant 
technology area, the Herfindahl index of sales in the firm’s product market as provided by the 
German Monopoly Commission, the industry-average of the reported effectiveness of patents “to 
obtain or improve competitive strength” (taken from the MIP survey of the year 1992), the age of 
the firm, and a dummy for East German firms, as well as a full set of dummies for the survey year 
and primary industry of the firm. 
 The results in column 1 of Table 3 show that fragmentation is positively and significantly 
related to licensing expenditures as a percentage of sales. We also estimate a probit model of the 
probability of licensing as well as a Tobit restricted to positive observations on licensing as a 
percentage of sales.  In the latter specification, we observe a positive but insignificant effect of 
fragmentation, while the effect in the Probit model remains statistically significant at the 5% 
level. We thus obtain evidence that fragmentation is associated with an increase in the probability 
of licensing but we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is unrelated to the total cost of licensing 
(though the point estimate is positive). Using the probit specification we find that an increase in 
fragmentation of one standard deviation increases the probability of in-licensing by 3.0 
percentage points. This is a sizable effect given that the probability of in-licensing is 22% in the 
sample.9   
The R&D/sales ratio is positively and significantly associated with licensing, as is the 
index for patent protection, consistent with the predictions of Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002) and 
Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001) that stronger IP rights are associated with more licensing. 
Larger firms spend more on licensing as a percentage of sales, but age is insignificantly related to 
licensing expenditures.   
                                                 
9 A related finding is present in Nagaoko (2008), which uses a survey of Japanese inventors. As the number 
of patents required to commercialize a technology increases, the propensity of firms to engage in licensing 
increases.  
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 We then turn to the question of whether fragmentation of IP rights affects innovative 
performance.  We focus on firms’ reported share of sales coming from products new to the 
market as our measure of performance.  Table 4 contains results from a Tobit regression in which 
the dependent variable is the share of sales coming from products new to the market (our measure 
of success with product innovativs).  The sample size is slightly smaller at 1343 observations 
since information on the dependent variable is missing for some companies.  We control for the 
patent stock of the firm, innovation intensity (total expenditure on innovation per employee), age 
and size of the firm, and industry characteristics such as the Herfindahl index of sales and 
importance of patent protection.  Overall, the estimated relationship between fragmentation and 
innovative performance is positive and marginally significant.  Importantly, however, this finding 
is driven by firms that do not license, because when we restrict attention to firms that report non-
zero licensing expenditure, we observe a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between fragmentation and innovative performance (as captured by this measure).  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that, for firms that require licenses to commercialize new 
technology, the fragmentation of upstream property rights hampers innovation. A one standard 
deviation increase in fragmentation reduces the share of sales with new products by 2.2 
percentage points for licensees and increases the share by 1.4 percentage points for companies 
without inlicensing activity. Relative to the mean of the share of sales this translates into a 
reduction of 20.0% and an increase of 16.7% respectively.  Estimated coefficients for other 
explanatory variables conform to expectations: we find positive and significant associations 
between innovative performance and innovation expenditure per employee and stock of granted 
patents, and a negative association between innovative performance and firm size (larger firms 
are more likely to have a larger share of sales from previous generations of products.)10 To dig 
                                                 
10 In regressions not reported here, we also investigated the relationship between fragmentation and 
strategic patenting. We regressed the firm’s patent stock on the fragmentation index and a set of control 
variables. However, in contrast to the work of Ziedonis, we do not observe any significant relationship 
between the firm’s patent stock and the degree of IP fragmentation. 
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deeper into these findings,  columns 4-7 of Table 4 present results comparing the innovative 
performance of “outsiders” (firms with fewer than five patents) and “insiders” (firms with five or 
more patents).  We chose the median number of patent applications of four to divide into the two 
subsamples. These regressions reveal that the negative relationship between fragmentation and 
innovation is strongest for licensing firms with fewer patents, while the positive effect of 
fragmentation among non-licensors is greater for firms with more patents. This result is 
intriguing, as it is consistent with the hypothesis that in-licensing firms with smaller patent 
portfolios are more susceptible to the type of hold-up associated with patent thickets, while firms 
with large portfolios that do not need to license upstream technology may actually benefit from 
the existence of patent thickets. 
 In Table 5 we present results from a similar regression in which we instead use as 
dependent variable an indicator of the firm’s success at process innovations – the amount of 
process-innovation-driven unit cost reductions. These regressions serve as an important 
robustness check. We do not expect to observe a significant negative relationship between 
fragmentation and this dependent variable, because the threat of hold-up from upstream patent-
holders should not impinge upon firms’ abilities to generate cost reductions through process 
innovations. Here, we see a similar pattern when we look at firms that do not license: a positive 
and significant relationship between fragmentation and process innovation. However, in contrast 
to the findings on innovative sales, we find a positive and statistically insignificant relationship 
between fragmentation and innovation for licensees. 
  In Table 6, we present results from regressions that include the interaction of 
fragmentation and innovation expenditure. The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and 
significant for licensees. This implies that the positive relationship between innovation 
expenditures and innovative sales is mitigated when the firm faces a fragmented IP landscape. 
One possible interpretation for these results may be that higher fragmentation requires firms to 
spend more on innovation in duplicative “inventing around” patented prior art.  An alternative 
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interpretation is that innovation expenditure is less effective in producing innovative sales when 
firms develop products for markets characterized by fragmented IP. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have examined the relationship between fragmented IP rights and innovative performance, 
taking into consideration the role played by in-licensing of IP.  We find that firms facing more 
fragmented IP landscapes have higher licensing costs, which is consistent with a “royalty 
stacking” story, and/or a relationship between bargaining problems and fragmented ownership of 
rights.  Note that this is not a reflection of a linear relationship between the number of licenses 
acquired and in-licensing expenditures: the fragmentation index captures a very different aspect 
of the patent landscape.  We also observe a negative relationship between IP fragmentation and 
performance with product innovations, but only for firms that engage in in-licensing. This result 
is perhaps surprising, since it suggests that even though firms are able to arrive at licensing 
agreements, they generate fewer sales from innovative products as a share of total sales than firms 
that must bargain with fewer potential licensors.  
The relationship between fragmentation and innovative performance also depends on the 
size of a firm’s patent portfolio. That is, the relationship between fragmentation and innovative 
performance is most pronouncedly negative among licensing firms that have fewer than five 
patents, and it is most pronouncedly positive among non-licensors with five or more patents. This 
finding is suggestive of the strategic importance of defensive patenting in the context of 
fragmented property rights – firms seem to be able to reduce the impact of fragmentation on 
performance by building up a stock of patents. This appears to be consistent with Ziedonis’s 
hypotheses about the benefits of defensive patenting when facing fragmented ownership of rights 
to complementary technologies. 
Some limitations of our study include the fact that companies without any patents are 
excluded from our sample. While we could not include non-patenters because of the way we 
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construct our fragmentation index (based on the technology area in which the firm has the 
majority of its patents), non-patenters may also face problems due to fragmentation of IP rights. 
Indeed, these may be even more severe: given our argument that firms with smaller patent 
portfolios are more negatively affected by fragmentation, we might expect firms with no patents 
to be even more negatively affected, and thus our findings may be viewed as an underestimate of 
the effect for these firms. Another limitation of our data is that we cannot observe cross-licensing 
agreements in which no licensing fees are paid. To the extent that firms use a mixture of licensing 
contracts with monetary compensation and cross-licenses, our findings about the importance of 
patent portfolio size could reflect the use of firms’ patent portfolios in cross-licensing to deal with 
the fragmentation problem.   
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that this research highlights the complex 
role played by market structure in the market for technology, and points to a number of 
interesting directions for further investigation.  While licensing transactions offer a means of 
accessing technology and product markets in the face of thickets of blocking patents, the 
economic efficiency of this mechanism is poorly understood, and it may have important limits.  
In particular, there may be important non-linearities in the relationship between fragmentation of 
IP rights, incentives to license, and costs of innovating.  For example, in the extreme case of very 
highly fragmented patent landscapes, the presence of too many licensors and too many patents 
may led to insuperable bargaining problems that render licensing impractical or irrelevant, 
bringing about a complete breakdown of the price mechanism in the market for technology.  Here 
we may expect to see quite different solutions emerge, with very different IP strategies used by 
market participants.   
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 Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev Min Max 
Employees 346.4 260 302.9 2 1500 
Age of firm (years) 20.9 14 22.8 0 175 
Sales (in million EUR) 62.43 38.45 92.71 0.19 1240 
R&D (in million EUR) 1.16 0.35 2.10 0 26.04 
Fragmentation 0.725 0.729 0.028 0.607 0.794 
Dummy licensing 0.219 0 0.413 0 1 
Licensing/sales (in %) 0.0542 0 0.198 0 2.12 
Licensing/sales conditional on 
licensing>0 (in %) 
0.262 0.123 0.367 0.0002 2.12 
Share of sales from products new 
to the market (in %) 
8.98 3 15.8 0 100 
Cost reduction due to process 
innovations (in %) 
5.01 2 7.47 0 61 
R&D/sales (in %) 3.21 1.31 5.91 0 63.6 
R&D/sales conditional on 
R&D>0 (in %) 
4.10 2.11 6.40 0.001 63.6 
Innovation exp. (in ‘000 
EUR)/employees 
7.88 4.26 14.99 0 261 
Patent stock of firm 10.36 4 20.25 1 236 
Patents at technology level (in 
‘000) 
3.05 2.77 1.48 0.275 12.28 
Index patent protection 2.67 2.62 0.464 1 5 
Herfindahl index of sales in 3-
digit industry 
45.3 14.67 66.7 0.88 416.1 
Dummy Eastern Germany 0.132 0 0.338 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation table 
 Licensing/sales R&D/sales Fragmentation 
Licensing/sales  1.00   
R&D/sales 0.111*** 1.00  
Fragmentation 0.021 0.017 1.00 
Note: * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 3%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Licensing expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Tobit 
Lic./sal. ≥ 0 
Probit 
 
Tobit 
Lic./sal. > 0 
Fragmentation  2.26** 1.05** 0.64 
 (1.03) (0.53) (0.98) 
R&D/sales 0.008** 0.002 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Patent stock of firm/employees 0.107 0.10 0.187 
 (0.159) (0.08) (0.207) 
Log employees 0.057*** 0.06*** -0.13*** 
 (0.020) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log patents at technoloy level -0.044 -0.01 -0.08** 
 (0.043) (0.02) (0.04) 
Herfindahl index -0.0005 0.0003* 0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Index patent protection 0.126* 0.08** -0.05 
 (0.067) (0.03) (0.06) 
Log age of firm 0.005 0.005 -0.02 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.02) 
Dummy Eastern Germany -0.089 -0.050 0.10 
 (0.065) (0.030) (0.06) 
Observations 1616 1616 334 
Log likelihood -713.93 -784.31 -80.95 
Note: The dependent variable in column 1 is a dummy for positive licensing expenditures. 
The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 is licensing expenditures/sales. Year and industry 
dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 3%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Tobit estimation: product innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All firms Licensees 
Non-
licensees 
Licensees, 
patents < 5 
Licensees, 
patents ≥ 5 
Non-
licensees,  
patents < 5 
Non-
licensees,  
patents ≥ 5 
Fragmentation 62.45* -138.2** 103.67*** -217.69* -144.25* 69.09* 118.30** 
 (33.22) (70.32) (38.16) (127.15) (78.18) (56.06) (50.24) 
Innovation exp./employees 1.15*** 0.414** 1.35*** 0.649* 0.601* 1.72*** 1.00*** 
 (0.096) (0.183) (0.135) (0.343) (0.369) (0.19) (0.145) 
Inno. exp./emp. squared -0.005*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.002* -0.013* -0.010*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log patent stock of firm 1.94*** 0.178 2.58*** 0.197* -1.048* 1.46* 2.35* 
 (0.677) (1.21) (0.813) (7.25) (1.47) (3.21) (1.55) 
Log patents at tech. level 0.653 4.40* -0.813 7.53* 2.29* -1.35* -0.883* 
 (1.34) (2.57) (1.57) (4.80) (2.67) (2.28) (2.13) 
Herfindahl index -0.003 0.022 -0.012 0.050* 0.036* -0.019* -0.004* 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.039) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) 
Index patent protection 3.52* 7.00 1.67 3.81* 11.89** -0.97* 3.19* 
 (2.14) (4.46) (2.48) (9.77) (4.65) (3.29) (3.94) 
Log employees -1.37** -2.68** -1.42** -4.262* -0.771* -2.04** 0.626* 
 (0.632) (1.31) (0.726) (2.44) (1.35) (0.938) (1.18) 
Log age of firm -0.307 0.016 -0.352 0.364* 0.388* 0.019* -1.56* 
 (0.586) (1.15) (0.683) (2.513) (0.999) (1.01) (0.916) 
Dummy Eastern Germany -1.48 0.038 -1.74 2.614* -5.61* -2.16* -1.34* 
 (1.93) (4.19) (2.19) (7.569) (4.65) (2.78) (3.70) 
Observations 1343 288 1055 133 155 606 449 
Log likelihood -3683.55 -958.03 -2698.15 -427.60 -497.60 -1403.67 -1263.88 
Note: The dependent variable is share of sales from products new to the market. Year and industry dummies included. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 3%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Tobit estimation: process innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All firms Licensees Non-licensees 
Fragmentation 34.39* 16.14 42.212** 
 (18.46) (39.13) (21.380) 
Innovation exp./employees 0.474*** 0.309*** 0.594*** 
 (0.058) (0.116) (0.084) 
Inno. exp./employees squared -0.002*** -0.001* -0.004*** 
 (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log patent stock of firm 0.873** 0.742 0.925** 
 (0.382) (0.681) (0.466) 
Log patents at technoloy level -0.096 -0.890 0.093 
 (0.802) (1.635) (0.926) 
Herfindahl index 0.004 -0.014 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) 
Index patent protection -0.301 -5.202** 0.774 
 (1.18) (2.426) (1.379) 
Log employees 2.06*** 1.556* 2.000*** 
 (0.389) 0.868 0.451 
Log age of firm -0.006 0.926 -0.335 
 (0.319) (0.649) (0.373) 
Dummy Eastern Germany -1.86 0.985 -2.706* 
 (1.20) (2.645) (1.390) 
Observations 1237 261 976 
Log likelihood -2843.04 -716.37 -2109.71 
Note: The dependent variable is percentage of cost reduction due to process innovations. Year and 
industry dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 
3%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Tobit estimation: evidence on inventing around 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Firms Licensees Non-Licensees 
Fragmentation 99.362*** -8.792 125.502*** 
 (35.781) (78.188) (41.636) 
-3.271*** -6.996*** -2.329 Fragmentation X        
Innovation expenditure (1.168) (2.257) (1.745) 
Innovation exp./employees 3.580*** 5.433** 3.056** 
 (0.883) (1.638) (1.295) 
Inno. exp./employees squared -0.006*** -0.002* -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log patent stock of firm 1.929*** 0.045 2.612*** 
 (0.674) (1.176) (0.812) 
Log patents at technology level 0.552 3.253 -0.774 
 (1.340) (2.509) (1.564) 
Herfindahl index -0.002 0.026 -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) 
Index patent protection 3.387 6.001 1.688 
 (2.130) (4.317) (2.478) 
Log employees -1.345** -2.314* -1.453** 
 (0.630) (1.277) (0.725) 
Log age of firm -0.313 0.153 -0.371 
 (0.585) (1.113) (0.683) 
Dummy Eastern Germany -1.566 1.738 -1.928 
 (1.927) (4.091) (2.191) 
Observations 1343 288 1055 
Log likelihood -3679.76 -952.16 -2697.30 
Note: The dependent variable is share of sales from products new to the market. Year and industry 
dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 3%, *** 
significant at 1%. 
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